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Abstract 
Central banks being creations of governments are not fully insulated from politics oft he 
day especially in developing countries, which affects performance of assigned function 
and should mainly be concerned with impacting their economies through the 
management of the monetary aspects. Ha}ling devolved the functions of regulation of 
the financial system to other institution who manages the system for optimum 
performance for the benefit the investors and consumers, they are more focused on the 
economy. This paper argues that the Nigerian financial system should adopt a single 
financial regulator who would regulate the various financial institutors rather than the 
present multifarious regulators. In the process, a number of issues on current mode of 
regulation and problems and their effectiveness were dealt with. This paper is of the 
opinion that it is proper to adopt the single regulator right away having laid the 
foundation in the FSCC, with one further step forward and need not wait until 2020 but 
allow the institution to mature by this period. The FSCC need not regulate all for now 
but the less key sector with the CBN should regulate the banks and SEC the stock 
braking firms, for certain reason in the interim. The remaining institutions should be 
regulated by yjr proposed new financial regulator. 
Introduction 
The Central Bank of nations is the most important national financial institution that 
exists in the country, having been established with the admixture of political and 
economic viewpoints (Rose, 2000) to manage the financial resources ofthe nation at the 
very least and to a provide a window to the international arena from within in the 
financial system. Some other Central banks also combine the position of a regulator and 
supervision of the banking and other financial institutions with this role. The function of 
management of the external rese::-ves of the nation is also included in the functions of the 
Central Bank. Yet in some developing countries, the role of the Bank is much more than 
this; the functions of debt acquisition, midwifing of development financial institutions, 
management of the government accounts and all other sorts of functions are saddled 
with the Central Bank. In some developing countries, the bank maintains an oversight 
function on the capital market directing its growth as well. This makes the Bank to 
become heavy with functions leading to lack of focus and direction. From the onset, it 
manages the side effect of the government fiscal mismanagement of the economy. For 
this reason most central banks get the blame for being unable to manage the 
macroeconomic variables of their country, especially inflation, prices and 
unemployment. Central banks are also involved the data collection so that they have 
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become the storehouse of information for the purpose of research. In these countri es 
information sourced from the CBN is more accurate and reliable than the main 
organization set up to gather and disseminate data. All the aforementioned are other 
ancillary functions the central banks of some nations including Nigeria, perfonn. 
The most visible of the functions of the Central bank ofNigeria are the supervision of 
the banking and other financial institutions in the country. Having regard to the roles of 
non bank and other financial institutions in the economy, their supervision in the 
country is not effective. This makes the sector to be less efficient (Adewunmi, 2005). 
This naturally brings so many challenges to the economy as the compliance and 
enforcement level of regulations in the sector is low. Being a government bank, the 
central bank also sees to the policy direction of the financial system of the economy. 
Before the current level of deregulation and recapitalization was achieved, Afolabi 
( 1999) mentioned a myriad of regulatory functions of the Central bank ofNigeria. It had 
directed credit to certain sectors of the economy while controlling the cost as well. This 
shows the level of authority and power exercised by the Bank over the affairs of the 
other financial institutions, as well as the direction and the tempo of economy in the 
country. For example, the CBN recently concluded plans to make an active market in 
the bonds market by creating a two tier structure at primary and secondary levels. With 
all of these, the Central Bank of Nigeria as it is today appear overburdened with 
extraneous responsibilities and functions that could easily be delegated or devolved to 
a new regulator within the financial system while it maintains focus on the monetary 
system in the economy and whatever other necessary role it chooses to perfom1. 
To this end, the paper the objectives of this paper are to discuss the issue of regulatory 
functions of the CBN as it is presently constituted and the adoption of a single regulator 
of financial services. To achieve these objectives, the paper is structured into five 
sections. Folio wing the introduction is the review ofliterature on the performance of the 
Central Bank within the government's influence. The basic objectives, purposes and 
theories of financial regulation are discussed. The perfonnance and position of other 
financial regulators within the system in the present milieu are discussed next. This is 
followed by the need to establish a new all encompassing financial regulator; and the 
models and methods adopted by two counties of interest to Nigeria. Finally, 
recommendations of the expected Nigerian model, conclusion and summary in that 
order ends the paper. 
Central Banks, Governments and Politics 
The role of Central Bank became important as from the time governments' need for an 
institution to handle its financial affairs became recognized forcing it to become an 
appendage of the Treasury or Finance Ministry. This in the process of time had turned 
the central bank into government bank that controlled the financial side of the economy 
with assigned and other functions incidental to the performance of a major one. Since 
governments cannot be divorced from politics it became embroiled in the process. 
Cuikerman and Webb (1995) measured the influence of politics and the changes in 
government on the possibility of changes in the governor of central bank within six 
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months of ascendancy of such government and found that the indicators vary across 
countries and correlates with changes in inflation real growth and real interest rates. 
These often lead to instability in the government policies and av~nues of implementing 
them as found in most developing countries, Nigeria inclusive. Alesina and Summers 
(1993), had earlier concluded that central bank independence promotes price instability 
and that it had no measurable impact on real economic performance. Governments have 
been known to quickly tum to the central banks to provide funds when in need, through 
for example (in Nigeria) ways and means advance (improperly) and treasury bills. The 
choice of the method to be adopted is left to the central bank. Recent experiences have 
made it important to consider the role of the central bank in the macroeconomic 
environment, where some of the actions of the government through it have had negative 
effects on the economy. A perfect example is constant monetization of oil receipts , 
which is in dollars causing sudden infusion of money into the economy. With this 
scenario, the central bank is left to clean up the financial system to optimal levels . This 
involves a cost. With these the challenges and others before the Nigerian central bank as 
noted by Obadan and Iyoha (1996) to include issues of macroeconomic policy 
environment, appropriate policy mix, the choice between fixed and flexible targets 
approaches and availability of reliable data to formulate polices, the central bank needs 
to have a rethink of its economy wide regulatory activities. 
The requirements of adequate regulation by the central bank are independence, 
. credibility, transparency and accountability in no particular order for better policy 
outcomes (Ccechetti and Krause, 2002). With the role of the government, it is doubtful 
if effective regulation can be performed by the central bank especially in developing 
country's environment such as Nigeria. The International Monetary Fund, in order to 
ensure standards requires that a code of transparency issued in 1999 should be adhered 
to by all countries. This is because of policy goals should be fully understood by the 
public at announcement stage, while it calls for accountability where a measure of 
autonomy has been granted to it. Nigeria bas consistently scored low in the measures of 
accountability. Where better macroeconomic performance and more efficient policy 
are indentified with values close to zero, Nigeria bas been found with the following 
indices: average inflation of26.08%, independence level of0.42, accountability 0.92 , 
and transparency 0.37 (Ccechetti and Krause, 2002). By irregular mode of appointment 
and its constant change, the Central banks have been made weaker, which in a way has 
disallowed the institution to grow up and mature (Calomiris and Powell, 2000). 
Today the Nigeria Central Bank regulates the banking and other financial institution in 
the system as to capital adequacy and other institutional framework. These regulations 
hardly cover products and services of the institutions, which should be the main 
attention of regulation where the investors and consumers who need protection from 
powerful institutions. Ekpo (2003) concludes that use of policy instruments by the 
Nigerian central bank has not impacted well on the economy with the basic challenges 
confronting the CBN such as the management of the underground economy poverty 
12251 
I 
.. I: 
I 
l, 
I 
·I 
I :! 
1: 
., 
II 
Lagos journal of Banking. Finance & Economic Issues 
reduction among others, still largely remaining. As a national financial institution, it is 
necessarily affected by politics and the lack of political will can be a stumbling block 
toward the achievement of its goals. A Senator of the Federal Republic was quoted to as 
saying the objectives of Vision 2020 plans are impossible to meet given the current 
situation of things . And yet the banking recapitalization and consolidation exercise 
would have failed if the politicians were allowed to have their way. The CBN has been 
reengineering itself in the past couple years and it should continue in this way to achieve 
its purposes. The Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation, like most deposit insurers act 
more like undertakers as they feature more prominently when the bank is in trouble to 
sound a death knell and pay off qualifying depositors. The role of the NDIC is reduced 
to that of adjunct and ancillary regulator in the performance of its functions within the 
financial system . 
Objectives ofFinandal Regulation 
While it is important to regulate the institutions to ensure they meet minimum capital 
adequacy standards, the basic objectives of regulation , according to Millinuex and 
Murinde, (2003), are consumer protection which looks at compensation to the 
customer where he is injured (not necessarily physically). Capital adequacy, which has 
been the main focus of the central bank, to ensure that insolvency is not permitted, and 
where it exists it is quickly corrected. Conduct ofbusiness in the market place addresses 
the fairness of prices for services as information asymmetry problem exist for the 
customer to choose between homogenous products and between providers. The 
institutions have better knowledge of the market than the consumers and lastly the 
promotion of integrity in the marketplace. This discourages market manipulation and 
lack of transparency in product offering and avoids systemic risk which requires a level 
playing field . A fading objective is the control and direction of the invisible hand of 
price by the market (Bernanke 2007), as potential risks have led institutions to be less 
adventurous in their products offering leading to market discipline (Calomiris and 
Gorton, 1991) and assumption of responsibility and self regulation. Aspinwall (1993), 
says because the objectives conflict, there is a reason to separate the management of 
regulatory institutions from operators. 
The main targets of regulation are the institutions, services and products and the entire 
system in that order. This must be case in these days of financial market concentration 
where few oligopolists control sizeable proportions of total market The first parameter 
is the encouragement of the institutions to be disciplined for the sake of the market and 
the system, ensuring that numerical targets set for them are evaluated to see shortfalls 
(Kotara 2005). The practice of universal banking with its tripod arrangement has 
complicated matters for central banks and other regulators who do not have integrated 
approach to financial regulation. 
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Other Financial Sector Regulators 
The CBN has less powerful counterparts in the insurance sector, capital market, and 
pension funds management. These regulators: National Insurance Commission, 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Pension Commission all have their 
various enabling and statutory laws that sanctioned their existence. All have narrow 
scopes that are daily thinning out and becoming complicated in a globalizing and 
integrating world. In this way the universal banking structure that Nigerian banks 
operates have blurred the separation of the functions in the financial market. Clearly, 
universal banking allows a bank to have an integrated capital market arm within its 
group. It can also perform insurance functions up to agency and brokerage levels or full 
services through a subsidiary . 
• Pension Commission 
The Pension Commission is the youngest of the regulators with very direct and 
specified functions which came as a result of the reforms in the sector. The institutions 
operating in the sector are mostly affiliated to insurance comparues who are affiliated to 
or a subsidiary of a bank, where the bank does not directly own or run pension funds as 
permitted by the Pension Reform Act 2004. Banks are mostly the Pension Fund 
Custodians. The registration, supervision and regulation of pension fund administrators 
and custodians become a daily affair that can be handled by the companies themselves 
except when breaches occur or new regulation is in the offmg. There are presently 25 
Pension Fund adrillnistrators 4 Pension fund Custodians and 6 Closed Pension Fund 
Adrillnistrators operating in the country. 
Securities and Exchange Commission : Capital Market 
All the banks have capital market arm which acts as the investment outfit for the bank. 
This subsidiary carries out all the functions of the capital market from issuing house 
functions to registrar activities. The financial system through the banks allows funds to 
filter from the money market into the capital market. At the conceptualization of the 
universal banking practice in Nigeria, regulators had proposed that the regulators will 
regulate each of the arms of the banks as if they were separate. This rillght seem easy, but 
funds flow from capital to money markets and back and forth freely. The spate of 
activities and registrations in the market especially during market bubbles can be 
confusing, so much so that parallel and wild cat operators may infiltrate the market and 
begin to dupe people of hard earned funds. The capital market is one where little 
transparency is seen as so much is taken for granted by the investors. This governance 
problems start from the registrars who would not post dividend warrants to withholding 
of certificates after allotment and clearance, to brokers who rillsapply funds of their 
clients and rillshandle their investment, Trade Alert notwithstanding. It is now known 
that it is possible to commit fraud in the Central Securities and Clearing System Ltd 
CSCS- the monopoly central depository institution in the capital market since its 
procedures are deficient (Onuoha, 2007). This is therefore one market to watch and 
continuously observe. This calls for adequate and quality regulation. The complications 
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arising from dealing in this market need be handled carefully in order to encourage 
investors to place their funds in the market and ensure the business firms access funds 
when they require it. The Investment and Securities Tribunal has not been seen to do 
much having handled 50 cases only between 1997 and 2003. 
National Insurance Commission Insurance 
The situation is more clear and less nebulous in the insurance sector though it having it 
is own share of challenges. The bases of regulation of the companies include capital 
adequacy, investment of funds, and fair market practices in form of early and quick 
settlement of genuine claims. National Insurance Commission has been active in the 
first and less concerned with others. Investments by insurance companies can lead to 
bankruptcy as w~ll as clients not been indemnified when due which can lead to. lack of 
interest to potential policyholders affecting the market. As before, where insurance 
activities are carried out by the Bank it is in a limited form. This implies an association 
with the bank somehow, where it is not owned out rightly. Since client protection and 
satisfaction is one of the goals of every regulator, this area is not satisfactorily handled. 
The scale of operations of the insurance companies in Nigeria is yet to reach the 
optimum because of tardiness to settle claims where interest is shown. For example, 
records from Hong Kong Insurance Complaints Bureau (2007) shows that a myriad of 
complaints can arise between the insurance companies and clients. These include 
application and policy terms (31 %), non disclosure (29 %) amount of indemnity (14%) 
excluded items (14%) breach of warranties (3%) and others (9%). This however is 
lacking in the Nigerian insurance industry as in other sectors . 
Other Financial Institutions 
Other Financial Institutions Department (OFID) in the CBN deals with non banking 
institutions like primary mortgage institutions, finance companies, discount houses, 
and bureaus de change who all operate and are regulated by the CBN. 
Discount Houses intermediates fund between the CBN and the Banks but is seen as well 
in the money market where it is a strong participant. The 5 discount houses in Nigeria 
are all reporting and are closely monitored since all are owned by banks. 
The Primary Mortgage Institutions present a different scenario since their set up in the 
late 1980s via Decree 53 Of 1989, the sector has not known tranquility via a legion of 
factors. With the initial licensing by the Federal Mortgage Bank ofNigeriathe operators 
found it difficult to keep within the rules as a result of lack of understanding of the 
mortgage market and ineffective supervision that' led to establishment of many PMis 
who concentrated their activities mostly in Lagos in the short term market of finance 
bouse functions. Revocation of 220 licenses in one swell swoop reduced their number 
drastically in 1994. About 78 are reporting with rridst being owned or affiliated to one 
other financial industry participant especially banks. This is'a sector that needs support 
even in the developed economies to perform its expected roles. That shOuld be available 
from the National Housing Fund. ' \ 
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Finance Houses are mostly operators in the shori tenn financial market. Actual 
·operators are not known as the number reporting is not regular and actual market 
S/N 
2 
3 
4. 
Regulator Financial Institutions Covered 
Central Bank of Nigeri a Banks, Discount Houses , pr1mary Mortgage Institut ions , 
-~ tyl_it;I()_fiQ.e_ng~,.l!Q_C.~ELn..a.J1c::~_.l::i.Qu_s~:;; ___________ . _______ _ 
- Secl.l-;ity -- a;;c:i ---E~c-hange Stock broking iirms , Issuing houses, Regi strars , Portfolio 
Commission ' Institutions (mutual funds )_ 
National Insurance Insurance Companies , Reinsuran ce Companies Agents and , 
Commission 
Pension Commission 
, Brokers 
Pension Fund Admi nistra tors, Pension Fund Custodians , 
Closed Pension Fund Administrators 
- TheFinanCial Services Regulation Coordination Comniittee 
The committee was constituted in April 1994 long before the adoption of the universal 
banking system in the country in 2000, comprising of the Security and Exchange 
Commission, NAICOM the Corporate Affairs Commission and the Federal Ministry of 
Finance. The NDIC, NSE and the National Board for Community Banks were co-opted 
as observers . The Committee has (or had) the regulators as members with the CBN as 
Chairperson. Its functions were set to discuss issues of common concern to regulatory 
and supervisory bodies. The Committee was empowered through the section 38 of the 
CBN Act, and was formally inaugurated in May 1999. Basic objectives of the 
Committee were to coordinate the supervision of financial institutions, eliminate the 
opportunities for arbitrage, eliminate the information gap between the regulators and 
articulate the strategies for the promotion of safe and efficient practices by financial 
intem1ediaries. Important regulatory committees such as distress, harmonization, 
infonnation sharing, legal enforcement and market development were set up. Since the 
setting up of these committees not much has been heard from the committee. 
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Rationale for a Single Regulator 
Theories of regulation emphasize that two main areas of regulation are in existence and 
of deep interest to the system, the institution and the consumer or client. Different from 
self regulation which arises from self-imposed actions of codes of conduct and world 
ethics, external regulation is imposed which could be for the purposes of tax 
administration . Theories of financial regulation concern the captive theory and 
competition for regulation theory where the beneficiaries of regulation attempt to 
control the system. Deregulation on the other hand may allow the public interest to 
suffer. Therefore the public interest theory that ensures the consumer is not made to 
suffer problems due to the inaction of the regulators, which is the main reason why these 
institutions are regulated for capital adequacy and other minimum requirements (Dale, 
1996). On the basis of the public interest Sheng (1997), found four grounds for 
regulation as follows: moral hazard, widows and orphans, public policy and the 
systemic risk arguments. The convergence in the financial market means that various 
section of the financial market are selling homogenous products or services of different 
hues to same persons and units . However, the two groups are the institutions and the 
customers which might be regulated differently, through different and autonomous 
commissions known as the Twin peaks (this has been criticized by Goodheart et al 
(1998)) taking charge ofthe institutions and customers or clients or whole and retail 
markets of the institutions . The twin peaks have its advantages among which are focus 
and specialization. Regulation is an art and a matter of convenience the method a 
country or economy chooses to adopt, but the essentials of regulation must be fully 
covered as to the benefit for the economy and the consumer or the public. 
Of late there has been the trend to constitute a single regulator for the entire financial 
services market. Countries have given up traditional practices and have imbibed new 
ideas in the name of globalization, modernity and exigency. The rationale for 
constituting single regulators is different in each case, but with one central focus: the 
public interest. From all indications the practice of universal banking, emergence of 
financial conglomerates and holding companies have brought about the need to 
establish a single regulator. It has also been assisted by integration of economies 
(Brauilt, 1999). In all of these, the consumer protection argument is paramount and 
accountability as the regulator becomes stronger. Mention is also made of the 
economies of scope and scale that attend to the regulator's functions in the market. The 
regulator not only saves so many resources in labor and capital but also in time. It can 
deal with many fmancial institutions and save time by dealing across financial 
institutions. 
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Table 2 Some of the countries that have adopted the Single Regulator Model 
No Country Year Established 
1 Norway 1986 
2 Canada 1987 
3. Denmari< 1998 
4 Japan 1998 
5 South Korea 1998 
6. Iceland 1997 
7 Australia 1998 
8. Luxembourg 1999 
9 England 1997 
10. South Africa 2003 
From various sources 
Models in Other Countries 
A number of countries have adopted the single regulator mode wholly, while some have adopted 
it with modifications to suit their level of development and transparency. From various studies, 
the first country to adopt the single regulation method is Norway in 1986. England adopted in 
1999. Between these dates, a number of Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (QECD) countries introduced the practice and have maintained it. Also, medium 
income countries and emerging economies have also introduced the practice in their financial 
system. India is interested; Jamaica, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are considering it while 
the continent of Europe through the EU has adopted it. New York State in the United States is 
considering the single regulator (Federating states are allowed autonomy to this extent! ). Most 
worthy of note in all of these countries is South Africa who adopted the single regulator 
mechanism to regulate the non-bank financial institutions, insurance companies and stock and 
bonds market. Below is the table of the countries practicing regulation by a single institution or 
its variety. 
United Kingdom established a single financial regulator that began operate before it was 
legally empowered. It covers virtually all the sectors of the financial services industry. A period 
of transition was put in place to during the transition to enable the banks especially to set industry 
standards supervise individual firms and handle industry wide issues. It meets with the Treasury 
(eqwvalent of Ministry of Finance in Nigeria) and the Bank of England on regular basis to 
discuss the financial matters concerning the country. The role of the Financial Services 
Authority of the United Kingdom covers the whole gamut of the financial system. Thus, UK 
single regulation is total. 
South Africa has a modified form ofbroad based financial services regulator that does not cover 
the banking industry, but every other sector in the country. Its main aim is to ensure an efficient 
running of the financial system in the country with in-built mechanism to encourage and 
promote investor protection. The Financial Services Board of the South African financial system 
therefore covers only a part of the financial system. The banking sector is being supervised by 
the Reserve Bank of South Africa. 
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Recommendation: The Nigeria Format 
The Nigeria financial system has become integrated since the introduction of universal banking 
that allowed the banks to have other functions apart from banking function they had before. This 
became more accentuated after the recent capitalization. Banks now have insurance affiliates, 
aside from capital market operations arm and mortgage companies within one group . At least 
three regulators are involved ill this group. With this it is difficult to effectively coordinate the 
activities where any of the institutions is involved in the malpractices. Illegal movement of funds 
within the groups can easi_!y be traced. A panicular sharp practice might be prevalent in a 
member and a waming or sanction may be more respected as it sends waming signal to other 
finns in the group. An integrated approach to regulation would be more useful here. A check at 
the capitalization level of the respective companies' would easily be monitored. An important 
area to look at on integrated basis is the role of a financial ombudsman who would look into the 
complaints of financial prod~tcts consumers and adjedicate between financial institutions and 
the consumers. In this way reports can be generated of the malpractices by institutions and other 
relevant information can be stored. This is an expected innovation on this area . 
The position of the single regulato:- !n Nigeria has been carved out during the introduction of 
universal banking and by constituting of the Financi:1l System Coordination Committee which 
was to oversee the universal banks as multiproduct channels in the financial system. The 
transformation of the Cornr.llttee to a single regulator (with a name such as Financial Services 
Commission, FSC) is the next step to the single financial regulator which is the next level in the 
financial system upgrade the Vision 2020 is anticipating. lt is not something to leave till 2020 
before its adoption. but what needed to be adopted right away and be allowed to mature within 
this period for the country to be among the top 20 economies in 2020, the pessimisms expressed 
by the politicians, notwithstanding. 
The process of the appointment of the head of the Financial Services Commission is as important 
as the person to be appointed. Two qualities that must be observable in potential appointees are 
integrity and experience as these will impact on the way and manner the commission will 
perform and its eventual success. 
Table 3. The New Proposed Regulators 
No Requlator Institutions Covered 
1. Central Bank of Niqeria De(2osit Mone:t Banks 
2 Security and Exchange Stock braking finns 
Commission 
3 Fi nancia!Services Discount Houses, primary Mortgage Institutions, Micrdinance 
Commission (FSC) BDC ,Finance Houses, Issuing houses, Registrars , Portfolio 
Institut ions (mutual funds) , Insurance Companies, 
Reinsurance Companies· Agents and Brokers, Pension Fund 
Administrators, Pension Fund Custodians, Closed Pension I 
Fund Administrators. 
--· ·-- ---- ---·-- ·- -
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Given the position of the banks as financial powerhouse and their importance to the 
economy it might be safe to allow the central bank to continue to regulate the banking 
sector because of the direct influence of the activities of the banks on the economy (this 
is the case in South Africa). The Discount Houses and the other financial institutions 
come directly under the Regulator. These institutions would include the MFBs, PMis 
BDCs and the Finance houses. The new regulator, for now can effectively handle all the 
institutions under SEC but for the stockbroking fim1s . The prevalence of parallel firm 
in the sector needs to be checked by a new method of registration which the SEC can 
handle. Other institutions within the framework of the Security and Exchange 
Commission can be effectively regulated by the regulator. With time and given and 
adequate guidance a~ has been in the last four years since the recapitalization started, it 
can be safely .assumed that the banks will be able to self-regulate themsel'lleS and the 
central bank may hand over the regulation with time. As a result of the bent ofthe new 
regulatory environment, the presence of a financial ombudsman is needed who should 
be equipped with all necessary apparatus to properly adjudicate on cases of exploitation 
of consumers by the institutions. This would be a strong feature of the new regulator for 
it to be meaningful. 
Conclusion and Summary 
It is safe to consider the fact that the current method of regulation does not allow an 
integrated approach towards the regulation of the financial system, bearing in mind that 
it is no longer the norm and the vogue the world over. The consumer is not protected by 
exploitative tendencies of financial services providers. Regulation as to capital 
adequacy and solvency may be adequate, but the marketplace integrity and 
transparency in the conduct of business is not in place. The various models of single 
regulation gives a choice of what to put in place to achieve a satisfied population of 
financial services consumers The process of achieving single regulatory institution 
will, as expected pass through the process of legislative approval and adequate legal 
framework. As would be expected a process of transition would be normal when the old 
and current regulators would coalesce to form the new one, which in most countries 
have been less than one year. The technical staff of the old regulators could be 
maintained until all the structures are fully formed for a smooth take off. The role of the 
CBN in the new structure would at the initial stage be to regulate the banking sector 
until the institutions are able to self-regulate themselves, enough to come under the 
purview of the new regulator. In the meanwhile the consumers would be able to relate to 
the new regulator on consumer protection purposes. The SEC would be expected to 
regulate the stock broking firms in time being within a space of two years for total 
sanitation of the sector before it comes under the new regulator. In the meanwhile the 
other institutions can come under the regulator right away. The National Insurance 
Commission and the Pension Commission can immediately devolve their functions to 
the regulator: 
This paper has dealt with the issue of a single regulator of the financial system as it 
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pertains to Nigeria adopting the model. It has looked at the inadequacy of protection the 
CBN as an example of a regulator and the need to adopt the model as the modem mode 
of regulation for the purposes of consumer in Nigeria. The various models have been 
examined as most countries have it in different forms with sole aim of maintaining 
prudential enviromnent for the industry and promoting consumer protection and 
welfare within the industry. Nigeria can make a different model or adopt one of those 
that are on ground in any of the countries, and at the end the financial regulator assumes 
full control for all the sectors of the financial system. 
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